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Proof problems and procedural obstacles for non-industrial workers seeking damages for personal injury from indoor air pollution are significant.  For instance, in Johns-Davila v. City of New York, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17012 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 20, 2000), a case involving employment discrimination, the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that she was disabled due to sick building syndrome.  She had alleged that SBS caused her to develop fibromyalgia and that; as a result, she was unable to work without taking regular stretch breaks.  In Adams v. Univera Health Care/Excellus, 26 A.D.3d 587, 807 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dept. 2006), an employee claimed that she was exposed to environmental irritants at her workplace that caused severe coughing, forcing her to stop working.  The Worker’s Compensation Board found that the employee had suffered a work-related jury due to poor air quality at her workplace.  However, the Appellate Division reversed, finding that the record failed to identify any allergen in her workplace that caused her symptoms.  Other cases have had similar results.  See, e.g., Ellis v. Appleton Papers, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19670 (N.D.N.Y. April 14, 2006) (court held plaintiff’s proof insufficient to demonstrate that formaldehyde from carbonless copy paper in office caused chemical encephalopathy); Bartlett v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8686 (N.D.N.Y. March 30, 2000) (court held that plaintiff’s claims of variety of ailments allegedly resulting from copier machine fumes, new carpet, and formaldehyde fumes barred on statute of limitations grounds); Rakowski v. State Insurance Fund, 10 A.D.3d 817, 782 N.Y.S.2d 167 (3d Dept. 2004) (Workers’ Compensation Board held that plaintiff’s allegations that he suffered from occupational disease as a result of formaldehyde fumes from office furniture were insufficient on their face); Nicholson v. Mohawk Valley Community College, 274 A.D.2d 677, 711 N.Y.S.2d 542 (3d Dept. 2000) (court upheld Workers’ Compensation Board’s denial of claim arising from plaintiff’s exposure to dust and other allergens in her work environment).

 Insurance cases are more encouraging for plaintiffs, with most courts holding that “absolute pollution exclusion” clauses in comprehensive general liability policies typically do not bar claims based on sick building syndrome. See, e.g., Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance Co., 47 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1995) (federal appellate court held that an insurance company had a duty to defend where the plaintiff claimed injury due to inhalation of carbon monoxide (CO) fumes emitted from a faulty heating system even though “absolute pollution exclusion” clause existed); Kenyon v. Security Insurance Company, 206 A.D.2d 980 (4th Dept. 1994) (in another CO inhalation case, the court held that “discharge, dispersal, release or escape” did not apply to the CO release, because “such an occurrence does not fall within the public understanding of pollution,” and so the absolute pollution exclusion clause was inapplicable); Roofers’ Joint Training, Apprentice & Educational Committee v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America, 275 A.D.2d 90, 713 N.Y.S.2d 615 (4th Dept. 2000) (the court rejected an attempt by insurance company to disclaim coverage of a claim that fumes from roofing process had injured claimant, holding that the absolute pollution exclusion endorsement “applies only to environmental pollution, and not to all contact with substances that can be classified as pollutants”).  However, in at least one case a court has held that an absolute pollution exclusion bars insurance recovery.  See Advanced Healthcare Resources, Inc. v. Merchants Insurance Co. of New Hampshire, Inc., 10/2/97 N.Y.L.J. 33 (2d Dept. 1997).